[Siege of Nanking and Second Sino-Japanese War.] Typed Memorandum and Manuscript Notes by British diplomat, of meeting between Sir Robert Clive and Japanese Ambassador Yoshida and Ichiro Hatoyama, and meeting with Manchukuo adviser A. H. F. Edwardes

Despite the fair amount of attention bestowed on the 'Anglo-Japanese Conversation' - the secret negotiations between the British government and the Japanese ambassador at the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War - it is only with the discovery of these two documents that it can be established that the two countries continued with informal negotiations until the fall of Nanking. They reveal meetings in November 1937 between former British Ambassador to Japan Sir Robert Clive and Japanese Ambassador in London Shigeru Yoshida, accompanied by the head of the Rikken Seiyukai, Ichiro Hatoyama, and between Yoshida's English adviser A. H. F. Edwardes and the anonymous author of the two documents. S. Olu Agbi, in his essay 'The Foreign Office and Yoshida's Bid for Rapprochement with Britain in 1936-1937: A Critical Reconsideration of the Anglo-Japanese Conversation' ('The Historical Journal', 1978), states that 'the secret negotiations between Yoshida Shigeru, the Japanese Ambassador to London, and Eden from July 1936 to July 1937 - later known as the Anglo-Japanese conversation - [...] came to an abrupt end with the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in July 1937'. (See also Agbi's essay 'The Pacific War Controversy in Britain: Sir Robert Craigie Versus The Foreign Office' ( 'Modern Asian Studies', 1983), and Stephen Lyon Endicott's 1975 book 'Diplomacy and Enterprise: British China Policy, 1933-1937'.) Clive is described in Nish and Kibata's 'History of Anglo-Japanese Relations' as maintaining a 'friendly posture towards Japan', and at the time of the 1937 'Luncheon' with Yoshida, he had recently been replaced as Japanese Ambassador by Craigie. At the time of the Yoshida meeting Clive, now Belgian Ambassador, had remained behind in Britain following a visit to the country by King Leopold, giving him an opportunity for the meeting with Yoshida, which cannot have taken place without the acquiescence of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden. Among the individuals present at the meeting was A. H. F. Edwardes, who had previously been an adviser to the Manchukuo 'government', and was now acting as adviser to the Yoshida. Edwardes, clearly acting in a semi-official capacity, had a further meeting with the author of the two documents, who appears to have spent time in Japan, perhaps as a chargé d'affaires (although his spelling is rather bad for such a post). In the typed memorandum he boasts that 'the Japanese Military Attache [...] happens to be an old friend of mine'. This is clearly a reference to Tatsumi Eiichi (1895-1988), as elsewhere the author speaks of information supplied 'by Col Tatsumi when I started to enquire after the mutual freinds [sic] that we possessed in that Army [in Manchukuo]'. ONE: Typed document, headed 'MEMORANDUM'. 5pp., 4to. With manuscript note at foot of first page. On five leaves stapled together; aged and with first leaf separated from the rest. Begins: 'Monday November 22nd 1937, Clive Lunched with The Japanese Ambassador to meet Mr. Hatoyama the leader of the Seyukai. | There was present among a number of others Mr Edwards [sic] whom I had previously met in his capacity a few years back of adviser to the Government of Manchuquo.' (Arthur Henry Francis Edwardes (1885-1951) was now an adviser to the Japanese Embassy in London.) At the meeting the two future Japanese Prime Ministers both 'strongly emphasised the desire that was felt in Japan for the restoration of peace', Hatoyama claiming that Japan 'had never desired this conflict & had not expected a General war, as opposed to a mere local outbreak'. According to Hatoyama a government spokesman gave assurances to this effect to the Diet, after being asked if he had 'read a book published in America the title of which was "China Prepares War against Japan"'. The last four pages describe the meeting with Edwardes, beginning: 'Mr Edwards asked if he could have a talk with me. We accordingly met at my house on the following Thursday November 24th. ' Edwardes claims that there is 'a general desire for Peace in Japan', shared by the 'Japanese Military', but that the 'Nine Power Conference' has become 'something of a difficulty & though some voices did think that it was desirable to treat it not as a disguised League of Nations but they were unable to carry their point of View.' Edwardes also states that 'the Japanese military who had been able to control the press [h]ad decided tat the anti British attitude of the press had been overdone & that it ought to be called off'. He refers to an interview between foreign correspondents and 'General Ugaki (Now one of the Ten advisers)'. The author of the document finds this 'a little hard to beleive [sic]', adding that there seems to be 'a beleif [sic] that very great generosity might solve the Sino Japanese problem & would as a result render the presence of Japanese troops in China a needless expense & render such institutions as the Hopei Political Council unnecessary'. He discusses the military consequences of Japan being 'left free to trade', adding: 'It is interesting to note in connection with this that at the time when the Japanese were suffering from shortage of men at the commencement of this incident the Commander in chief of the Kwantung Army (the army based on Manchukuo & the Kwantung leased territory) [d]eclined to send more than one division to the assistance of the Other Japanese forces & that most if not all of them have in fact been sent back to Manchquo. [sic]' The memorandum next turns to Edwardes's comments on 'the possibility of Good Offices of this Country', with the author pointing out that 'he did not actually say that he was authorised to ask for them but he gave me the impression that he would be happier if they were'. Edwardes has 'a rather sad feeling that Britain might be prepared to act as intermediere [sic] a role which he seemed to think that Japan could not very well welcome'. Edwardes concludes by stating that both the ambassador and Hatoyama are 'exceedingly anxious that Peace might come before the fall of Nanking', feeling that if not too late 'it would have a most important effect on world opinion if only it could be done'. The document concludes with a paragraph in which the author gives his own views on the matter, ending with the observation that Japan 'may think that the Halifax conversations are a warning to her that England intends to Stake heavily upon European apeasement [sic] & that the opportunity for freindship [sic] may go by leaving her completely isolated. Hence it may be that she is prepared to start conversations in this curiously round about way in order to save time.' TWO: Corrected manuscript notes of the two meetings described in Item One, clearly made earlier, and doubtless used when working up that document. 2pp., 4to. The first section, of only seven lines, is headed 'Yoshida's Luncheon', and the second, covering a page and a half, is headed 'Edwards.' Hurried notes, with the contents fundamentally the same as in Item One. For example: 'Great Britain's Freindship [sic] Intermediàre [sic]. Seemed some misaprehension [sic] as to what the term meant. Bringing parties together & then imposing a decision.'